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I. INTRODUCTION
The title for this conference on "Transboundary Freshwater Ecosystem
Restoration" is deceptively compact. Several complex but related issues of
institutional design are compressed into that short phrase. First, there is the
challenging theme of transboundary coordination. The difficulties of crossing
political and property boundaries to achieve coherent ecological goals are
longstanding topics of debate in environmental law at both the domestic and
international levels. Beyond that central issue, the conference title also raises three
more implicit topics for discussion: how do modem understandings of ecosystems
affect choices about the configuration of institutions to transcend existing
boundaries? Do freshwater resources present special issues or opportunities for
insights into means for coordinating wise decisions across boundaries? Finally, does
the goal of restoring rather than simply protecting existing resources pose particular
problems for efforts to organize ecological decision-making?
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law; JD 1976, Harvard Law School; BA 1973,
Yale University. My thanks to Jason Schaff and Will Fiske of the editorial staff of this law journal.
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This article explores a few key aspects of these themes, drawing from recent
literature on development of institutional frameworks for ecological decision-
making. This article begins with an overview of some characteristic problems
created by boundaries in the ecological context by exploring the reasons behind
the frequently expressed need for transcending, bridging, or overcoming
jurisdictional barriers. The discussion then turns to institutional challenges raised
by advances in the scientific understanding of ecosystems, and the difficult task
of correlating human boundaries with ecological ones. It then considers the
application of these themes in the freshwater context, and the particular
conundrums that arise when the goal is to rework landscapes to achieve
ecological restoration. Finally, this article argues that while existing jurisdictional
boundaries may indeed pose barriers to reaching wise ecological decisions, the
configuration of new and more effective institutional frameworks depends in
crucial ways on new boundary-making efforts.
II. THE TRANSBOUNDARY PROBLEM
A. Common Pool Resources and the "Tragic" Effects of Boundaries
Other papers for this conference deal in depth with the implications of
sovereign borders for interactions at the international scale. Here, it is worth
pausing to more broadly reflect on the generic problem of jurisdictional
boundaries in natural resource management. Whether the line is a political border
between countries, states, or municipalities; a boundary between government
agencies that manage natural resources in public ownership; a demarcation
between the regulatory jurisdictions of administrative agencies; or a property line
between adjoining private landowners; a boundary represents a division of
decision-making authority over resources among different forms of human
organization. Boundary lines are manifestations of broadly defined property
regimes.' They mark allocations of authority over resources among organizations
that include powers of exclusion. Boundary lines also denote potentially
differing forms of governance within organization borders.3
1. Property regimes are broadly conceived here to mean resource management institutions that include
public property, common property, and private property, whether expressed through formal laws or informal
norms. See Susan Hanna, Carl Folke, & Karl-Goran Maler, Property Rights and the Natural Environment, in
RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 4-5 (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RIGHTS TO NATURE]; see also Robert
C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1319 (1993) (discussing customary norms as aspects of a
"land regime").
2. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731-32
(1998) (discussing exclusionary authority as central to the meaning of property).
3. See Fikret Berkes, Social Systems, Ecological Systems, and Property Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE,
supra note 1, at 87, 97-101 (summarizing regulatory mechanisms for controlling uses and users found in
different types of property regimes).
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When water, fisheries, and other renewable migratory resources extend
across boundaries, concerns about fragmentation in human organization arise. As
often observed, the dynamic and interactive qualities of "common pool"
resources make meaningful compartmentalization difficult, and demand some
sort of integrated means for coordinating human activities. Where ecological
interdependencies create complex repercussions across space and time, the
resource will have greater value to the society at large if somehow managed "as a
,,4
whole" or as a "going concern.
The freshwater ecosystems that we are considering here have the
paradigmatic characteristics of renewable common pool resources Portions of
the resources may be removed for human use and consumption without
disrupting the renewal of hydrological and biological patterns, but the
renewability of the underlying system of resources depends upon sustaining
complex interconnections and interactions. 6
In these situations, when interconnected ecological phenomena extend
beyond jurisdictional authority, the fundamental criticism of boundaries is related
to the unwillingness or inability of autonomous organizations to coordinate their
activities so as to take effects beyond their borders into account.7 In essence,
those exploiting the resources are accused of causing ecological harm while
hiding behind the protective shield of their boundary lines.
The concern that decision-makers inside a boundary will be unable to
perceive ecological repercussions outside a boundary line, or that they will be
unwilling or unable to control repercussions when they do perceive them, is often
compared to a "tragedy of the commons."8 The classic narrative of a "tragedy"
narrowly depicts self-interested and autonomous individual actors who are
motivated to exploit resources ahead of others, and who inexorably overuse
resources in an unregulated open-access commons to their joint detriment. Their
failure to come together to establish property rights or regulatory mechanisms for
excluding excessive exploitation and managing human activities leads to
wasteful destruction of otherwise renewable resources. The commons lacks
meaningful boundaries, aside from the exclusionary capacities of individuals to
4. See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 261, 291-92 (1990) (discussing why resources such as rivers have greater value when they are
kept intact rather than divided among individual owners).
5. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Edella Schlager, The Formation of Property Rights, in RIGHTS TO
NATURE, supra note 1, at 127, 129-30 (outlining key characteristics of common pool resources).
6. See Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 30-33 (1990) (distinguishing the resource system from the flow of resource units subject to
appropriation and use).
7. See Eyal Benvenisti, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL
RESOURCE USE 23 (2002) (observing that political borders that disregard boundaries of natural resources, and
fail to take environmental and hydrological characteristics into consideration, preclude efficient outcomes).
8. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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grab, use, and profit from the resources that they capture. The ensuing tragedy
results from the absence of mechanisms for taking external effects into account.9
In the transboundary setting that is the focus here, the shared resources do
not lie outside all boundaries. In this regard, they are not open-access in the sense
of being "open to all." The adjoining jurisdictions have an ability to control
access by others to the shared resources within their joint boundaries. Where
migratory resources flow in a particular direction, as in the case of a river system,
the upstream jurisdiction is also in a superior geographical position to limit
access by the downstream jurisdiction--for example, when it builds an
impoundment to capture water resources."'
Transboundary resources are not simply bisected by political borders, but
typically segmented by property and administrative lines. We are not dealing
with the autonomous and unconnected individuals of a simple tragedy-of-the-
commons narrative, but rather with well-organized groups of people who have
already achieved various forms of organization and management through existing
economic and political forums that are reflected in a multitude of boundary lines.
Nevertheless, the concept of a "tragedy" resonates with observed problems of
collective action in transboundary ecosystems. The problems arising from actions
by fragmented organizations are akin to those that arise from the uncoordinated
actions of independent individuals. In essence, autonomous entities grab and
impair resources without taking ecosystem-wide impacts into account. Eric
Freyfogle has called this phenomenon of fractured control a "tragedy of
fragmentation.""
Despite the existence of multiple boundary lines, and explicit assertions of
organizational ownership and control, important aspects of the resources
nevertheless lie outside available systems of monitoring, accounting, and
coordination. Although the existing political and property institutions may define
many facets of authority over the resources in question, the benefits of
coordinated action across boundaries are not realized.' 2 In a sense, this is an
9. Carol M. Rose, Given-Ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L.
1, 4-7 (1994) (examining the reasons why tragedies of the commons occur in the management of environmental
resources).
10. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 970 (1997)
(distinguishing collective action problems in dealing with pollution of transboundary resources from those
relating to pollution of resources in open-access commons outside sovereign control, and further distinguishing
problems of unidirectional and reciprocal pollution).
11. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmentation, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 322-31 (2002).
12. Fragmentation of authority can produce overuse of resources in an open-access commons, or it can
produce underuse in an "anticommons," where boundaries prevent owners from engaging in beneficial activity
without the cooperation of the others. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1167 (1999). But see Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 911-12
(2004) (describing the range of "common interest tragedies" that can result from fragmentation of entitlements,
and questioning distinctions that have been drawn between tragedies of the commons and anticommons). In the
context of concerns about transboundary ecosystems, one might argue that the fragmentation created by
boundary lines both causes the overuse of resources, and establishes exclusionary barriers that prevent use of
the ecosystem as a functioning whole.
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acknowledgement that seemingly well-defined property rights are in fact
uncertain and incomplete, and that important factors of great value to the society
at large have simply been left out of the system for defining, regulating, and
transferring rights. Existing boundary lines then merely serve to validate the
uncoordinated and shortsighted behavior of groups and organizations, instead of
providing a means for recognizing and protecting important ecological values. 3
For example, when water withdrawals along a river deplete the water flow
needed to sustain wetlands across a boundary, a fundamental criticism is that the
actors on either side of the boundary lack workable political and market
institutions for considering the damaging environmental effects of the upstream
uses, and for limiting, allocating, and transferring water rights in light of the
diverse ecological and economic values at stake. This criticism does not merely
mean that upstream water uses are having harmful effects downstream, even
though that certainly may be a significant concern. Some trade-offs between
consumptive uses of water by people and instream uses of water by other people
or organisms would presumably occur even in a well-coordinated system of
unified governance. To say that something "tragic" has occurred means that
different and ecologically wiser decisions would have been reached through
better institutional arrangements.
Why then do adjoining jurisdictions in these circumstances often fail to come
together to pursue joint interests by creating an integrated resource management
regime? If the number of entities involved were not too large, one might imagine
that a clear boundary line could simply provide the starting point for negotiations
and transactions leading to the creation of a coordinated framework.'
4
Nevertheless, to varying degrees depending on the locations and circumstances, a
range of transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive failures can
contribute to difficulties in developing integrated regimes for sharing resources in
transboundary ecosystems.1
5
The inability of unconnected actors to respond to information about external
impacts creates an especially prominent set of problems.16 Myopic decisions
13. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 991-94
(1995); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction: Itegrating Water Controls and Land Use Controls: New
Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 1, 34-49 (Craig
Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005) [hereinafter WET GROWTH] (addressing problems of fragmentation in
integrating land use, water use, and water quality controls).
14. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and
Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 226-33 (2002) (describing situations in which cooperative solutions are
likely to emerge, and distinguishing the incentive structures from those of open-access commons).
15. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note I, at 325-26 (noting, inter alia, the costs of transactions and the
problems of free riders and holdouts); see also Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 256-65 (2000) (exploring reasons why resource users fail to
embrace solutions to open-access commons problems).
16. Holly Doremus, Crossing Boundaries: Commentary on "The Law at the Water's Edge," in WET
GROWTH, supra note 13, at 271, 295-312 (exploring informational and institutional obstacles to decision-
making that transcends existing boundaries, and suggesting improvements); Freyfogle, supra note 11, at 324
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result both from failures to obtain and react to ecological information, and from
shortsighted perceptions of self-interest.17 The information necessary to assess
and incorporate ecological values in decision-making may be costly, difficult to
obtain, or difficult to understand. Information gathering and processing
mechanisms within organizations may be faulty. The institutional context may
encourage a lack of attention to spillover effects, as, for example, when narrow
legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies limit the type of
information and relevant goals to agency tasks.' 9
In this perspective, the boundary line brings about a sort of institutionalized
obliviousness. The autonomous organizational actors are unable to perceive
ecological information with enough precision and urgency to take it into account.
This concern about inadequate ecological understanding intersects with concerns
about how organizational self-interest is discerned. Determinations of self-
interest rest inevitably on the consideration of available information, while
motivations to gather and attend to information derive from projections of
expected benefits.
B. More Property or Less?: The Search for New and Better Boundaries
When organizational decision-makers fail to perceive and respond to
information about ecological repercussions beyond the lines that represent the
bounds of their authority, does society need to eliminate boundary lines, or create
new ones? This question amounts to asking whether there is "too much" property
in existing institutional arrangements, or "not enough" property. ° In modem
controversies over transboundary ecosystems, both assertions are, in a sense,
true. On the one hand, existing boundaries may seem to reflect and solidify the
authority of autonomous actors to take fragmented and ecologically unwise
(suggesting that boundaries create incentives to ignore spillover effects, and that a proliferation of boundaries
increases the problem).
17. See, e.g., Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As if Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
1195, 1196-99 (2004) (fragmentation created by boundaries fosters myopic decisions that fail to consider
landscapes as whole ecosystems).
18. The insularity of experts created by their professional specializations can also contribute to the
shortsightedness of the entities to which they provide information. WET GROWTH, supra note 13, at 35-36;
Richard B. Norgaard & Paul Baer, Collectively Seeing Complex Systems: The Nature of the Problem, 55
BIOSCIENCE 953, 953-54 (2005); Sharachchandra L616 & Richard B. Norgaard, Practicing Interdisciplinarity,
55 BIOSCIENCE 967, 968-69 (2005).
19. See Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 205 (discussing effects of narrow agency missions); Robert B.
Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293,
318 (1994) (describing legislative mandates of federal agencies that create obstacles to integrated ecosystem
management initiatives).
20. Carol M. Rose, A Tale of Two Rivers, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (1993) (reviewing JUAN DE
ONIs, THE GREEN CATHEDRAL: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AMAZONIA (1992) and THEODORE
STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE WATERS OF NEw ENGLAND (1991)). For a
recent exchange of differing views on the "too-much-property or not-enough-property" debate, see Robert W.
Adler, The Law at the Water's Edge: Limits to "Ownership" of Aquatic Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH, supra
note 13, at 201, and Doremus, supra note 16.
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actions without taking external effects into account. This observation points
toward a need to find ways of transcending the fragmentation represented by
existing boundaries, in order to manage ecosystem resources "as a whole" on
behalf of a community of people that likewise extends across organizational
lines.
Conversely, a diagnosis of a "tragedy" also logically leads to a demand for
boundary creation." If fragmented jurisdictions cause common pool resources to
be wastefully exploited without attention to important ecological values, then
some sort of resource management system needs to be created that can take the
overlooked ecological values into account, and thus control exploitation. 2  This
amounts to a demand for configuring a property regime that has effective means
for regulating the use of available resources among members of a redefined
community, while excluding incompatible encroachment at a redesigned
periphery. In short, the real problem might not be "too much" property, but in
fact, not enough.23
What might be the structure of a newly devised property regime? One
frequent suggestion is that boundary lines ought to be redrawn so that
jurisdictional boundaries of the management organization coincide with the
structure of ecological phenomena.24 If ecological degradation stems from a
"mismatch" of integrated ecosystems with the fragmented boundaries of human
decision-making institutions, then, as the suggestion goes, the boundaries of
natural resource management institutions should be reconfigured to mirror the
scope of ecological interconnections and the full range of environmental
repercussions. 2' Notably, this commentary suggests that boundary lines may
21. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 910 (noting that unifying property interests to overcome problems of
fragmentation in the management of complex interdependent resources requires fracturing other interests that
might otherwise be bundled together).
22. See Hanna, Folke, & Miler, supra note 1, at 9 (asserting that property regimes provide critical means
for coordinating human with natural systems so as to protect ecosystem dynamics).
23. Rose, supra note 20, at 1627. See also Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE
L.J. 991, 1019 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? and KAREN R. MERRILL,
PUBLIC LAND AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM
(2002), and noting that newly-evolving property rights can provide means for protecting and expressing
relationships of people to resources and to each other).
24. See e.g., Lance H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling & Stephen S. Light, Barriers Broken and Bridges Built:
A Synthesis, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 489, 526-27
(Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS AND BRIDGES]; see also Timothy H. Profeta,
Managing Without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in Light of Ecological Advances, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 71,97 (1996).
25. See Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & A "Post-Sovereign" Transboundary
Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 113, 116-20 (2004) (discussing scale mismatches and recommending
strategies for matching forums to the scale and nature of the resources); see also James Salzman, Creating
Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 881-82 (2005) (discussing
institutional obstacles to creating new institutions that stem from the lack of alignment between political and
ecological boundaries); Cymie Payne, The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water:
Foreword, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 620 (1997) (introducing symposium themes, including issue of conflicts
between natural and legal boundaries).
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become impediments to ecologically wise decisions; not merely if they cut across
shared resources spanning existing borders, but also if they are "too large,"
including people who are insufficiently interested in or knowledgeable about the
26
resources, so that the people are poorly motivated to protect the resources.
Implicit in this argument that ecosystem management institutions ought to be
the "right size" are two key suggestions about improving human decision-making
forums. The first suggestion is that forums for acquiring and considering
ecological knowledge should be reconfigured to ensure acquisition and
consideration of information that is currently ignored. That suggestion invites
discussion of how knowledge gathered by scientific experts through research
may be meaningfully transmitted, and how other sorts of local knowledge of
ecosystems may be recognized and incorporated through inclusive decision-
making processes. The second suggestion is that by redefining the relevant
community to mirror the web of ecological repercussions, including a more
carefully targeted range of affected interests, narrow calculations of
organizational self-interest may be transformed into broader assessments of
community welfare.
Whether characterized as a means for revamping the determinations of
organizational self-interest, or as a means for opening decision-making processes
to new information, the goal of these recommendations is to foster new forms of
coordination, and to incorporate additional concerns as a basis for resource
management decisions. The purpose of the re-conceived boundary line is both
inclusionary and exclusionary: new "voices" and interests should be included in
the decision-making, so that ecologically harmful activities can be regulated or
excluded.
The notion that human governance structures should match the configuration
of the natural resources they purport to address is appealing. Nevertheless, as
explored in the next section, the delineation of the relevant ecosystem unit and its
affiliated human members is hardly a simple matter, even when the
transboundary aspects of ecological resources seem self-evident. Indeed, modern
advances in the study of ecosystems have both added new conundrums to debates
over the configuration of appropriate institutions, and contributed new concepts
to the coordination of human and ecological dynamics.
III. THE COMPLEX GOALS OF FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION
A. Configuring Institutions to Match Ecosystems
A river that crosses a boundary line from one jurisdiction to another may
appear, at first glance, to be a single, integrated transboundary ecosystem.
26. See Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 212-17; Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 119 (noting that scale
mismatches include situations in which a state is too large to deal effectively with environmental problems of a
regional or local character).
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However, the implications of the transboundary ecological connections for
institutional design are not necessarily simple." The ecological complexity of the
river system itself gives rise to complicated questions about the appropriate scale
and configuration of institutional arrangements."
Efforts to coordinate uses of ecosystems through institutional arrangements
must not only confront the conflicting claims of multiple human actors, but also
the complex dependencies and interactions among other organisms, and the
abiotic aspects of their environments. Advances in scientific research have
highlighted the dynamic, multilayered, and unpredictable attributes of
ecosystems. Several key observations about the dynamics of ecosystems have
had important effects on recent recommendations about the wise configuration of
human institutions 9
1. Uncertainty, Nonlinearity, and Unpredictability
The dynamics of ecosystems are sufficiently complex that predictions cannot
be made with certainty. Non-linear processes mean that small changes may be
magnified through feedback mechanisms, while the effects of seemingly large
events may be greatly diminished. Even though equilibrium conditions may
emerge, multiple equilibria are possible, and abrupt shifts from one condition to
another may occur in unpredictable ways.30 Patterns are discernible, but they are
not fixed or stable. Instead of static conditions, researchers see patterns of ongoing
activity and transformation, sometimes described as recurrent phases of exploitation,
conservation, release (or "creative destruction"), and reorganization.'
27. See Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Mangement and the Everglades: A Legal
and Institutional Analysis, II J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 478 (1996) (warning against "facile efforts to
realign jurisdictional boundaries along ecosystem lines, without far-reaching political and institutional
realignments").
28. See Adler, supra note 13, at 1093-94; Karkkainen, supra note 14, at 206-210; Keiter, supra note 19,
at 294-95; see also Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection:
Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS 233, 240-45 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS]
(discussing implications of resource complexity).
29. See Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. LAW 207, 207-21 (2002) (introducing a discussion of recent scientific developments that have
implications for the configuration of legal frameworks).
30. See C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 26 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S.
Holling eds., 2002) [hereinafter PANARCHY] (summarizing findings about episodic change and multiple
equilibria).
31. ld.at32-35.
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2. Multiple Scales, Semi-Autonomy, and Self-Organization
The non-linear processes of ecological change take place at multiple scales.
Relevant factors in understanding ecological change may be different depending
on the scale of analysis. While ecological activity is not entirely chaotic and
indecipherable, diverse patterns of change are discernible at many different levels
of activity." The various scales of analysis are sometimes described as "nested,"
or interrelated through a "hierarchy" of connections, although the reference is not
to a top-down framework or central control structure, but rather to patterns of
influence in multiple scales of adaptive organization."
While the patterns of activity at various ecological scales are interconnected,
not all ecological events are connected to each other to the same degree or in the
same way. Rather, some processes support and reinforce each other to create
phenomena that may be seen as relatively independent of other processes in the
environment. Researchers depict semi-autonomous, self-organizing phenomena
that are "loosely coupled" across scales. 34 Self-organizing processes protect and
perpetuate identifiable patterns, even though these remain subject to influence
and disruption by external factors.35
3. Ecological Resilience and the Human Role in Ecosystems
The human economy is significantly insulated from local environmental
disruptions by various methods of storage and global transportation of goods;
however, it is ultimately linked to, and dependent upon, the dynamics of
ecological processes. Because the human economy and ecosystems are
intertwined, long-term human welfare depends on fostering processes of
ecological self-organization.36 In this regard, human society is dependent on
ecological resilience, or the capacity of ecosystems at all scales to renew their
patterns of activity through self-organizing processes following disruptions.
3 7
The concern in the literature on ecosystem resilience is not only that the
political and property frameworks of the human economy are configured to
32. See Bosselman, supra note 29, at 226-27 (discussing the separation of complex systems into layers
and phases for purposes of analysis).
33. See C. S. Holling et al., Sustainability and Panarchies, in PANARCHY, supra note 30, at 72-74
(noting that the use of the term "hierarchy" is misleading, and recommending the adoption of the alternative
term "panarchy").
34. See, e.g., Bosselman, supra note 29, at 230-31 (describing research on self-organization).
35. Holling et al., supra note 33, at 69.
36. See, e.g., Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Linking Social and Ecological Systems for Resilience and
Sustainability, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL
MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 1, 20-22 (1998) (emphasizing linkages between economic and
ecological processes); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law,
43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 8-44 (2001) (tracing the development of concepts in ecological economics).
37. Berkes & Folke, supra note 36, at 11 -1 3; Holling & Gunderson, supra note 30, at 27-30 (contrasting
concepts of "ecosystem resilience" and "engineering resilience").
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maximize efficient short-term production of commodities valued in economic
transactions, but that they destroy the variations that are essential for resilient
renewal of ecosystem patterns over the longer term.38 The same market-based
devices that human society uses to buffer itself from local ecological disruption
and ensure the stable supply of commodities undermine the abilities of ecological
communities to shift, adapt, and reorganize in the wake of changing
circumstances.39
For example, the waterworks that divert, store, and deliver water to
municipalities or agriculture at reliable rates, and thus buffer human society from
flood and drought conditions, may disrupt the variations in water quantities and
quality to which other organisms are adapted. The lowered water levels in a
flowing river, during a period of drought, then may be so altered that ecological
connections are broken, and organisms die or fail to reproduce. The rigid,
commodity-oriented human system produces brittle ecosystem conditions that are
subject to abrupt change. Yet, given the reliable supply of water off stream,
human institutions may fail to pay attention or respond. Precipitously, the river
species may disappear, replaced by very different organisms suited for survival in
warm, oxygen-depleted, pond-like conditions. Such sudden switches produce
new ecological conditions, but the community of organisms and the functions of
the prior system are lost.
4. Adaptive Management and Institutional Learning
While the unpredictability of ecosystems means that ecosystems cannot be
closely controlled, an optimistic view suggests that people can fruitfully manage
their interactions with other organisms and ecological phenomena by fostering
the variable processes that renew environmental dynamics, rather than
maximizing production of stable streams of commodities from renewable
resources. Given the complexity and uncertainties of ecosystems, this goal
requires management strategies that involve ongoing learning and adjustment.40
First, people and their organizations, in making decisions about the exploitation
of natural resources, must adjust their own resource uses in adaptive ways to
accommodate the patterns of ecological variation to which other organisms are
38. C.S. Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 24, at 6-9.
39. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living within Nature's Boundaries, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 968-69 (2000) (noting the effects of closely managing ecosystems to reduce variability and
produce commodities). See also Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442-46 (1993) (contrasting the "economy of
nature" and the human "transformative economy").
40. For discussions of key institutional issues in adaptive management approaches, see generally Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of "New Age"
Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001); Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems:
Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105 (1996); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive
Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV.
943 (2003).
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adapted.41 Second, a commitment to adaptive decision-making must include a
sophisticated willingness to monitor ecological conditions, and to observe and
learn from experience. People need to find new institutional means for "tuning
in" to ecosystem dynamics--as uncertain and unpredictable as they may be--and
for adjusting human activities to fit these dynamics.43
5. Organizations That Are Nested or Otherwise Linked Across Scales
We return to the central question of institutional design: what does the multi-
layered, dynamic, complex ecological perspective that has been sketched above
mean for the design of human resource management institutions, and for the
formulation of boundary lines in particular? If pursued in depth, the call for
decision-making frameworks to match ecological phenomena that change over
time and occur at multiple scales is a multilayered recommendation."
A relevant part of social science literature emphasizes that resource
management regimes, like the ecosystems to which they are related, may be
studied at multiple scales.4'5 This perspective discerns analogous patterns in
ecological and social forms of organization. 6 It sees people coordinating their
resource management activities within semi-autonomous organizations that may
be nested within, or linked across scales to, other forms of organization .4 7 It seeks
to understand the relationships between ecological processes and patterns of
human activity, and to find out whether some forms of human organization are
especially well-suited to perceiving ecological patterns and managing human
activities to foster ecosystem renewal.48 From this perspective, both large and
41. See Berkes & Folke, supra note 36, at 21 (arguing that maintaining adaptiveness and resilience is
important for social institutions as well as resources).
42. Id. at 21-22. The incremental, experimental approach is fundamentally a pragmatic one. See
generally, Symposium, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic Experience, 87
MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003).
43. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1139-44 (1994) (discussing the need for adaptive management
approaches in light of pervasive problems of scientific uncertainty, and noting the implications for finality in
law).
44. Fikret Berkes, Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up, in THE DRAMA
OF THE COMMONS, supra note 28, at 293, 301-3 10; Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management
in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 816-17 (1997).
45. See Adler, supra note 13, at 1088-92 (recommending multiple nested scales of organization in
watershed management, given the importance of both regional and local control); Karkkainen, supra note 14, at
222-25 (discussing "nested scales" of information and considering ways of pooling information through
regional collaborative institutions).
46. E.g., C. S. Holling & Steven Sanderson, Dynamics of (Dis)harmony in Ecological and Social
Systems, in RIGHTS To NATURE, supra note 1, at 57, 65-66 (drawing parallels between ecological and social
patterns).
47. Berkes, supra note 44, at 295-300.
48. Carl Folke et al., Synthesis: Building Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Social-Ecological
Systems, in NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY AND
CHANGE 352 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 2003). See also James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems,
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small-scale forms of coordination could be important in designing institutions
that are attuned to ecological phenomena.49
The concept of nested organizations has prominently figured in studies of
management practices of indigenous peoples and other tightly-knit local groups
that are closely dependent on the resources of their immediate environments for
survival.s These studies focused on small and local organizations in seeking to
understand the factors that seem to make some communities especially adept at
perceiving, fostering, and adapting to dynamic ecological patterns in an
integrated fashion. These studies conclude that some long-enduring community-
based management regimes succeed in limiting and adapting patterns of resource
exploitation in complex ways that reflect sophisticated measures for fostering
ecosystem resilience in common pool resources.5'
In addition to a system of internal resource management norms, these
systems also include effective methods for excluding persons outside the group
from unauthorized exploitation of resources.52 The management regimes are thus
sometimes described as "property on the outside, commons on the inside." 3
Policing of the perimeter boundary line prevents exploitation of the resources by
outsiders. Within the boundary line, the community manages resources for the
benefit of the group, regulating members' resource use through enforcement of
community norms that may include cultural practices and other informal means.1
4
The studies of local organizations provided concepts for understanding the
activities of culturally homogeneous and tightly knit local communities.5 They
also provided a springboard for considering more broadly how the form and scale
of human organizations for managing natural resources--including the
configuration of organizational boundaries, and the means for developing
and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 28 , at 327, 352-53
(discussing importance of aligning the organization of institutions with ecosystem patterns to provide for the
flow of information and foster the learning process).
49. Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale
Interactions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 28, at 263, 265 (describing relevant spectrum of
scales).
50. Ostrom, supra note 6, at 101-02 (identifying "nested enterprises" as a key characteristic of
successful regimes).
51. See, e.g., Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Back to the Future: Ecosystem Dynamics and Local
Knowledge, in PANARCHY, supra note 30, at 121; Johan Colding et al., Living with Disturbance: Building
Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, in NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 48, at 163,
179-81; Johan Colding & Carl Folke, The Taboo System: Lessons About Informal Institutions for Nature
Management, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 413 (2000).
52. See Fred P. Bosselman, Replaying the Tragedy of the Commons, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 391 (1996)
(reviewing ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994)) (discussing
importance of boundary rules and limits on the number of users).
53. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998).
54. Id. at 174-80 (considering community-based management regimes as a form of "limited common
property").
55. The papers for this conference include informative case studies from U.S. water management
experiences in the Southwest.
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relationships within and across those boundaries--might affect the dynamics of
ecosystems.
These studies gave impetus to efforts to discern how organizations develop
capacities for astutely perceiving complex ecological information and adjusting
human activities in a coordinated way to foster ecosystem resilience. They also
focused attention on the possibility that various forms of joint or communal
management could serve to unite disparate actors while coordinating human
activities within patterns of ecosystem change. "Limited common property"
regimes may be seen to include other types of organizations besides the tight-knit
local groups that were the focus of early studies, which rely on informal norms to
manage subsistence economies.16 For example, common-interest residential
communities and specialized resource user groups established under the umbrella
of a regulatory regime might also be seen to set up integrated resource
management regimes within the parameters of an organizational boundary.57
These views draw attention to several important topics that have a bearing on
transboundary resources. First, the boundary line that seems to give rise to a
transboundary conflict is not necessarily the only important boundary at issue.
Just as the ecosystem itself functions at multiple scales, incorporating nested
patterns of ecological interactions, so too the exploitation and management of
natural resources by people is channeled (and might be further coordinated)
through multiple scales of societal organization. This observation highlights the
importance of discerning the influence and capabilities of smaller scale forms of
both private and public organizations, even when such organizations alone do not
unilaterally control all aspects of a larger transboundary conflict. Such
organizations may include groups that currently do not have formal protection
through law, but operate in a coordinated way through informal norms. This is a
polycentric and multi-faceted perspective on relevant modes of human
organization. It suggests that crucial activities and decisions may be
accomplished outside the direct organizational control of government and by
coordination within and among other entities, including local communities,
nongovernmental organizations, and private associations.
Second, this approach highlights the importance of studying the internal
dynamics, capacities, and incentive structures of self-organizing groups. It
suggests a wide-ranging consideration of possible organizational forms that, like
the community-based resource management regimes of the early studies, are
"property on the outside, commons on the inside." These organizations provide
56. Rose, supra note 53, at 139-44 (addressing "limited common property" regimes).
57. See Rose, supra note 28, at 252-53; Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110
YALE L.J. 549, 553 (2001) (arguing that many resources might best be managed through "liberal commons"
regimes that establish community rights for a limited group of owners while also guaranteeing individual
members a right of exit). Among the sorts of organization that might be of particular interest in the context of
restoring transboundary freshwater ecosystems are water trusts and ecosystem services markets. See Mary Ann
King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 495 (2004); James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005).
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potential models for coordinating and controlling the exploitation and sharing of
common pool resources within a group, while maintaining an effective external
boundary to exclude outside users and detrimental uses that would interfere with
managing the resources "as a whole" at a relevant scale.
Third, this perspective invites scrutiny of the extent to which particular forms
of human enterprise foster or undermine ecological resilience. It encourages
protecting or favoring those organizations that have been especially ingenious in
navigating complex ecological phenomena. Implicitly, this approach demands
evaluation of a group's social capital, including its adaptive and self-organizing
capacities, to see whether it has developed coordinating mechanisms for
integrating human activities with ecosystem dynamics.
Fourth, the literature on multi-scale institutional arrangements draws
attention to the potentially crucial constitutive and supporting roles of national,
state, and local governmental authorities in recognizing, launching, encouraging,
and policing the boundaries of such forms of organization. It invites
consideration of the role of larger-scale governance mechanisms in establishing
ground rules to foster new forms of group self-organization in pursuit of
ecological goals. Additionally, it raises difficult questions about the appropriate
"vertical" linkages among different scales of organization."5
Finally, this perspective demands new and rather subtle understandings of
independence and control. It postulates a framework premised on semi-autonomy
and degrees of influence at multiple scales. This is an approach that requires
looking at both inside and outside the boundaries of an organization, the
dynamics of self-organization, and the external defining forces that shape
connections with other semi-autonomous forms of authority.
In sum, institutional arrangements for managing common pool resources may
be considered at multiple scales that coincide with the ecological resources upon
which they rely. The recommendation that human institutional arrangements
should be designed to match the ecosystems in which they operate stems from an
effort to find structural means for adjusting human activities to accommodate,
pay attention to, and foster ecological patterns. If this recommendation is
accepted, then it makes sense to discern, and to make efforts to support and
create organizations for coordinating human activities that operate semi-
autonomously at multiple scales.
58. Paul Stem et al., Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research, in THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS, supra note 28, at 445, 465-66, 477-78. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471
(2004) (discussing "New Governance" scholarship, and noting significantly differing views within this umbrella
label, particularly with respect to roles of government and coercive mechanisms in setting the stage for effective
self-organization and collaboration).
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B. Freshwater Ecosystems and the Goal of Ecological Restoration
So far, we have considered the challenges of effectively dealing with modern
understandings of ecosystems in configuring human resource management
regimes. The conference title highlights a further, related question: what special
issues arise when the management goal is restoration of a freshwater ecosystem?
This section considers a few of the further complexities presented by freshwater
restoration initiatives.
1. Freshwater Ecosystems
Freshwater ecosystems not only provide vivid examples of conflicting human
activities resulting in ecological degradation of common pool resources, but they
also provide the settings for complex forms of coordination and institutional
innovation. Freshwater ecosystems thus offer particularly intriguing and fruitful
contexts for more generally exploring puzzling questions about how new
resource management regimes may emerge to coordinate human activities with
the self-organizing patterns of ecosystems.
Perhaps more than any other ecosystems, freshwater ecosystems give rise to
complex competing claims among people. Fresh water is critical for human
survival, as well as for the survival of aquatic organisms. Fresh water also
supports a wide range of beneficial uses, including fishing, agriculture,
navigation, and recreation. The potential uses of water conspicuously conflict,
requiring divergent instream and offstream locations, differing water qualities, or
different flow characteristics. The complexity of human and non-human
interdependencies can seem especially apparent in the freshwater context 9
The intensity and complexity of human conflicts over freshwater resources
have helped to motivate the initiatives in freshwater resource management that
mark the leading edge of broader efforts to develop ecosystem-oriented property
regimes. Watershed-oriented task forces, partnerships, and stakeholder groups
led the way in collaborative attempts--both successful and unsuccessful--to create
newly integrated forums for adaptive resource management. 60 Well before the
modem era of collaborative management processes, the freshwater context
offered illustrations of semi-autonomous human organizations configured to
59. The Klamath Basin provides particularly vivid and recent illustrations of complex conflict. See Holly
Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q.
279 (2003).
60. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Polycentric Wet Growth: Policy Diversity and Local Land Use
Regulation in Integrating Land and Water, in WET GROWTH, supra note 13, at 393, 417-18 (discussing
collaborative processes of watershed-based problem solving, and citing to extensive recent literature on the topic);
see generally ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND WATER CONFLICT: NEW INSTITUJTONS FOR COLLABORATIVE
PLANNING (John T. Scholz & Bruce Stiftel eds., 2005) (assessing case studies of recent water management efforts
in Florida).
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match the structure of ecological resources.6 In social science research, some of
the main themes of community-based resource management regimes have been
developed through studies of water management organizations. 2
In U.S. law, concepts of the public trust doctrine and community-oriented
obligations to ensure the sustainability of renewable resources have been more
thoroughly elaborated in water law than in other areas of natural resource
management.63 Notions that the underlying renewable resource must be managed
as a whole to support multiple interdependent community needs, and that private
rights are usufructuary and subject to modification to serve community goals are
well-established.64
Freshwater ecosystems also provided important examples of efforts aimed at
making human organizations better able to recognize and foster the semi-
autonomous, self-organizing activities of non-human organisms. Reservations
and appropriations of water for instream purposes are important developments in
the configuration of water management regimes, particularly when they are
formulated to support self-organizing capacities of communities of organisms in
rivers and wetlands, and not simply the stable production of individual species
for human consumption or prescribed water levels for human recreation. Water
quality standards and associated biological criteria likewise support the self-
organizing capacities of aquatic life when they are adequately elaborated in
regulations with concepts of ecosystem resilience in mind.65
Property-like allocations of water resources for the benefit of non-human
organisms at least provide the potential for enhancing the ability of human
forums to perceive and account for effects on ecosystem resilience at multiple
scales.66 These resource allocations, if backed by effective means of boundary
enforcement by administrative agencies or non-governmental groups, provide a
bridge between socioeconomic and ecological frameworks. They extend the
concept of nested semi-autonomous organizations to encompass both human and
non-human participants. These developments in property law, particularly as they
have evolved in the freshwater context, represent significant advances in
formulating institutional arrangements that coincide with ecosystem structures.
61. See Rose, supra note 53, at 179 (noting that nineteenth century riparian law decisions effectively
created common property regimes along rivers, limiting water use by riparians through a "reasonable use"
standard while excluding outsiders).
62. See Rose, supra note 28, at 239 (discussing irrigation systems as leading examples of community-
based resource management regimes, but noting that the management of water in irrigation systems for
agricultural purposes is not necessarily linked to effective protection of broader ecosystem functions).
63. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 EcOLOGY L. Q. 351, 354 (1998).
64. Sax, supra note 39, at 1452-53 (invoking more generally usufructuary systems of water rights as
models for property rights in ecosystems).
65. See generally Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29 (2003).
66. The property-like characteristics of resource allocations for self-organizing ecological communities
are explored further in Lee P. Breckenridge, Can Fish Own Water?: Envisioning Nonhuman Property in
Ecosystems, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 293 (2005).
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2. The Conundrums of Restoration Initiatives
Initiatives to accomplish restoration to earlier ecological patterns face even
more difficult challenges than efforts to foster the existing dynamics of
freshwater ecosystems.67
First, technical and practical obstacles abound. The unpredictable, uncertain,
and nonlinear characteristics of ecosystems mean that relevant factors for
achieving desired change may be unknown and especially hard to determine.
Alternatively, accomplishing a return to prior circumstances may seem too costly
given available societal resources.6 8
Second, if sufficiently ambitious, these initiatives often face significant
political challenges when they demand sweeping revisions to longstanding
allocations of resources. Of course, if a transboundary liability scheme is in
place, orders for restoration of damaged resources may be available through
established legal channels. But where ecological understandings are only
emerging, and resource allocations have ignored ecological concerns in the past,
restoration projects encounter significant barriers.69 Restoration projects may
demand a dramatic unsettling of firm human expectations premised on
longstanding circumstances. The legitimacy of established forums, the finality of
earlier decisions, and the security of property rights may be at issue. When
efforts to return significant quantities of water to instream uses means disrupting
or terminating ongoing economic enterprises, legal challenges and claims for
compensation are likely to follow.
Third, to be effective, restoration initiatives tend to involve taking dramatic
steps. The measures must be large-scale and sweeping enough to affect the key
structuring variables of the ecosystem. The hope is to move from degraded
conditions that may be self-sustaining to other desirable and resilient conditions.
A danger of acting in too limited a fashion is that the restored conditions will not
be resilient and self-sustaining. 70 However, more extensive measures may be well
beyond the capacity and jurisdiction of any local group to pursue. Consequently,
restoration projects present particularly difficult questions of how to link and
coordinate decision-making across multiple scales of human organization.7'
67. See generally Robert B. Keiter, Ecological Restoration and the Public Lands: Toward a More
Natural Order, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10443 (2003) (exploring both the promise and the difficulties of restoration
initiatives on federal lands).
68. See A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1181-87 (2003) (reviewing problems that the dynamic and uncertain characteristics of
ecological processes pose for ecosystem revival efforts).
69. See Adler, supra note 20, at 212-23 (providing examples of restoration plans undermined by
opposition of property owners).
70. Stephen R. Carpenter & Kathryn L. Cottingham, Resilience and the Restoration of Lakes, in
RESILIENCE AND THE BEHAVIOR OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS 51, 64 (Lance H. Gunderson & Lowell Pritchard
Jr. eds., 2002).
71. Id. at 65 (noting the need for new social and institutional mechanisms to achieve resilient
restorations).
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Despite these practical, political, and legal obstacles, restoration proposals
offer intriguing questions and worthwhile topics of debate relating to the
appropriate configuration of human and ecological interactions. Goal-setting and
boundary-drawing are important aspects of the decision-making. Implicitly,
restoration efforts not only demand significant adjustments in the roles of people
and other organisms, but also changes in the identity of ecosystem participants.
The question asked is not only, "what organisms are here, and who has interests
in this ecological community?" But also, "who, or what, ought to be here?"
If orchestrated in light of modern understandings of ecosystem resilience, a
restoration effort is a community-building endeavor that involves both human
and non-human participants. Fostering dynamic and variable patterns of self-
renewing activity and restoring a semi-autonomous, self-organizing ecological
community are activities that require resource allocations and boundary lines to
succeed, which, in this sense, also involve reconfiguration of institutional
arrangements.
Restoration initiatives in freshwater ecosystems can thus raise complex,
value-laden questions about the formulation of societal goals.72 But they can also
provide forums that are at the forefront of institutional innovations to rethink the
structure of human interactions with the ecosystems on which people rely. These
are situations where accomplishing change will likely depend upon allocating
water resources for the purpose of enabling and protecting the self-organizing
capacities of non-human organisms, while withholding or reserving these
resources from conflicting human uses. The resulting institutional arrangements
will be, in the broad sense, new property regimes that provide new methods for
defining, monitoring, tracking, and transferring resources in ways that take
ecological repercussions into account.
IV. CONCLUSION
Initiatives to restore freshwater ecosystems in transboundary contexts
demand institutional innovation as well as scientific expertise and technical
creativity. This discussion has sketched some of the challenges that arise in the
search for workable and ecologically wise governance mechanisms to advance
these proposals. Whether the boundary is a political border or a property line,
fragmented jurisdictional authority can pose barriers to managing human
activities with ecological repercussions in mind. The perceived obstacles to wise
decision-making lead to calls for more inclusive forums that cross boundaries
and conform to ecosystem lines. Yet the complex, multi-scaled, changing
patterns of ecosystems pose conceptual complications in efforts to match human
governance structures with ecological dynamics.
72. Alyson C. Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 187, 201-
204 (2000).
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Studies of community-based resource management regimes have suggested
that relevant institutional innovations may in fact occur at multiple semi-
autonomous scales, which is in parallel with the "nested" structure of ecological
patterns. This polycentric perspective encourages consideration of the ability of
organizations at multiple scales to perceive and respond to ecological
information, and to adapt to ecological variations. It also invites consideration of
boundary lines as important governance mechanisms delineating forms of
commons management rather than as barriers. These property regimes may help
to channel human endeavors to correspond with ecosystem dynamics.
Freshwater settings engender especially complex human conflicts. The wide
array of human and ecological dependencies, the conspicuous tradeoffs between
competing instream and offstream uses of water, and the density of human
settlements in close proximity to watercourses contribute to the intensity of the
disputes, and the difficulties of integrating human socioeconomic endeavors with
ecosystem dynamics. Nevertheless, freshwater ecosystems provide an especially
fruitful context for elaboration of ecologically attuned governance mechanisms
that hold promise as models in other settings.
Ecological restoration initiatives in transboundary freshwater systems
encounter these characteristic challenges, and they also give rise to particular
conundrums related to the efforts to launch new ecological communities to
displace old ones. Restoration projects are disruptive, and they face significant
political, legal, and practical barriers to implementation. But at the same time,
they provide innovative forums for reconfiguring property regimes in light of
ecological relationships. In particular, they demand new means for allocating,
tracking, and protecting resources to foster the semi-autonomous, self-organizing
patterns of ecosystems. Transboundary freshwater ecosystem restoration
initiatives highlight the need for new boundary lines, even as they invite efforts
to transcend the divisions expressed by old ones.
